This paper estimates the causal effects of the 2003 reform of the Italian apprenticeship contract which aimed at introducing the "dual system" in Italy by allowing on-the-job training. The reform also increased the age eligibility of the apprenticeship contract and introduced a minimum floor to apprentices' wages. Using administrative data and balancing techniques we find that five years after hiring, the new contract improves the chances of moving to a permanent job in the same firm, yet this happens mostly in large firms. There are also sizeable long-run wage effects of the reform, well beyond the legal duration of apprenticeships, compatible with increased human capital accumulation probably due to the training provisions of the reform.
Introduction
Many countries facing high youth unemployment rates want to improve their Vocational Education and Training (VET) systems to shorten the transition between school and work (Quintini and Martin, 2006) . Among the many alternative types of VET or post-school study, it seems that apprenticeship contracts work better in several countries (see for example Bonnal, Mendes, and Sofer, 2002 for France; McIntosh, 2004 McIntosh, , 2007 for the UK; Lee and Coelli, 2010 for Australia; Winkelmann, 1996 for Germany). Apprentices receive vocational training to enhance their professional skills and competences while employers are compensated with payroll tax rebates and lower wage costs.
Differently from stand-alone training programmes, the apprenticeship regime is in general heavily regulated by governments and social partners.
The implementation of the apprenticeship regime in Europe has followed different routes (Eichhorst et al., 2015) . In some countries such as France the apprenticeship is integrated into the educational system and focuses on theoretically-based training in schools and certificated institutions.
In other countries such as Italy, the apprenticeship regime is separated and contiguous to the formal education and the learning is mostly firm-based. In Germanic speaking countries (Germany, Austria and Switzerland but also Denmark) the so-called "dual system" integrates the apprenticeship contract in the educational system but high importance is also reserved for on-the-job training.
The dual system seems to be more effective than other options of the VET system at helping youth transition into employment: with respect to alternative academic or training education, it shows a faster integration into the labour market, although the effects are more evident in big firms (Soskice 1994) . Often apprentices do not find work in the training firm, suggesting that firm-specific skills are not so important in the German apprenticeship system (Parey, 2009) . Furthermore, no differences in wage returns relative to the academic track are observed in the long run (Fersterer et al., 2008; Pischke and von Wachter, 2008) .
Many countries tried to improve their apprenticeship system moving it towards the successful examples of Germany and Switzerland (Woessmann, 2008; Gambin, 2009 ). The dual system ensures high-quality training and requires a high degree of employer involvement. Apprentices are paid during the apprenticeships and at the end of the experience centralized accreditation of training curricula creates transparency and promotes acceptance among employers (Dustmann and Schönberg, 2012) . Not only European countries but also the US and UK tried to develop dual VET programs. For example the 2009 UK reform -the Apprenticeship, Skills, Children and Learning Act -tightened the link between the apprenticeships and employers offering large incentives for employers to increase training activities (Department for Education, Department for Business and Skills, 2013) . In the United States, both the National Youth Apprenticeship Act of 1992 and the School-to-Work Opportunities Act of 1994 were (failed) attempts to implement the dual system (Lerman and Rauner, 2012; Krueger and Kumar 2004) .
Traditionally in southern countries (Italy and Spain) the role of apprenticeship (and in general vocational training) is marginal because employers prefer to hire workers on fixed-term contractsfor which there is no need of a formal vocational training -and because families have a strong preference in favour of academic training (Planas, 2005 and Felgueroso, 2010 for Spain; Tattara and Valentini, 2009 for Italy) .
In this paper, we evaluate a reform of the Italian apprenticeship which tried to move it towards the German dual system: Law no. 30/2003. The reform raised the age eligibility from 24 to 29, set a minimum wage to the apprentices' compensation and allowed firms to train apprentices on the job rather than with formal education to tighten the link between employers and apprenticeships. Law no.
30/2003 did not uniform the qualifications across regions (a central characteristic of the German system) because in Italy qualifications are a regional competence. Regional governments had to implement the national law before it became effective locally, and this allows us to use regional variation to identify the effect of the reform.
Much of the difficulties in the evaluation of the effects of apprenticeships come from selection.
Most of the literature compares the employment outcomes of apprentices with a control group (often students in the academic education track or in other VET tracks or college graduates), however it is likely that controlling for observable characteristics is not enough to avoid an omitted variable bias because youth deciding to study VET may have different unobserved preferences about work from those who choose an alternative education system or no education.
With respect to previous papers, in this study the problem of selection is limited. Moreover, our focus is not on the effects of apprenticeships versus other forms of youth employment contracts, rather on the effect of changing the features of the apprenticeship contract. To estimate the effects of the 2003 reform, we exploit the contemporaneous presence of two different apprenticeship contracts between 2005 and 2011 due to the heterogeneous time of the implementation between regions and sectors. Individuals could not decide the type of apprenticeship, which depended on the region and the sector of work. We compare the employment and wage path of the apprentices in the new regime to the ones in the old regime, and estimate the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT). We can assess the effect of the reform with a long time horizon following the hiring (seven years), which is important considering that the apprenticeship regime in Italy can last up to 5 years. We deploy balancing techniques (namely the Covariate Balancing Propensity Score estimator) that control for differences on a large set of observable characteristics and past outcomes. Furthermore, we perform exogeneity checks of treatment eligibility by testing whether variation of migration or commuting flows affected the composition of the eligible youth in the treated regions.
The empirical literature on the transition of the apprentices to open-ended contracts (the socalled transformation rate of a temporary contract) in Italy is scarce and shows ambiguous effects. Berton et al. (2011) find that other temporary contracts outperformed the apprenticeship contract in terms of transformation rates during the period 1998-2004. Conversely, Picchio and Staffolani (2013) show opposite results on workers aged 30 (the age threshold for the apprenticeship contract) during the period [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . In this paper, we aim to understand whether the different features of the apprenticeship contract drive these contrasting results in the two periods, besides other differences in business cycle and workers' composition. Two former papers have analysed the effect of Law no. Looking at firm level outcomes, Cappellari et al. (2012) show a positive impact of the apprenticeship reform on job reallocation and productivity.
Our estimates indicate that the reform managed to decrease the early dropout of the apprentices by 11.6% in the first year. After an initial lock-in effect, the transformation to open-ended jobs increased by about 14.5% five years after the hiring. Analyses on heterogeneous effects indicate that the reform's impact is larger in firms with more than ten employees: in the first year the dropout rate decreased in large firms by 21.1% and the transformation rate to open-ended jobs in the same firm after four years increased by 39.7%. Consistently with a pattern of higher job stability, we also find long-term effects on wages.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the apprenticeship contract in the period of the reform and the changes introduced by the Law 30/2003. In Section 3 we describe the dataset, while in Section 4 tests on the exogeneity of the regional laws are implemented. Section 5 presents the identification strategy. Results and robustness tests are shown in Section 6, while the last section concludes.
Features of the Italian apprenticeship contract
The apprenticeship contract is characterized by an obligation for the employer to provide workers' training which is compensated with payroll tax rebates and lower wage costs. Since its introduction in the Fifties the only requirement for eligibility of an apprenticeship contract has been age while previous work experience has never been a pre-condition. In the period of the analysis, the training accounts for 120 hours per year and is divided into basic skills (35% of the hours) and technical competences for the profession. Basic skills include training on labour laws, work organization, safety and communication while technical competences regard products and services, production processes, tools and materials of production. Only firms in the private sector may use the contract, and the maximum number of apprentices in a firm has to be below the number of employees. However, enterprises with less than three employees may hire up to three apprentices. Employers have to appoint an internal advisor as mentor of the apprentice: he or she attends external preparatory training and may follow at most five apprentices.
Firms choose the training courses from a regional sector catalogue (the content of training course is a regional competence), while lower wage costs (defined by the sector Collective Bargaining Agreements -CBAs) and high tax rebates compensate the employers for the training requirement.
Employers' Social Security Contributions (SSC) are reduced at 10% of the apprentices' gross
earnings (for open-ended and fixed-term contracts they account for 27% of gross earnings). There are further incentives for firms with less than ten employees, granting almost full tax exemptions for the 1 First, to facilitate the use of the apprenticeship contract, it raised the age ceiling to 29. Second, it liberalised the training component and allowed part of it to be performed on-the-job.
Third, it set the contract duration between two years and six years, although the CBAs could specify a shorter range within this limit. 2 Finally, the Law introduced a minimum wage level for apprentices:
1 Other two forms of apprenticeship were introduced, covering a minority of the contracts (1% in 2007 (1% in -ISFOL, 2010 . Notably, the two contracts implied a different level of compensation for the apprentices and a different training regime (only external or both internal and external). In general, regional authorities organised the same external training for both regimes (ISFOL, 2010) . In principle, firms could not decide which regime to use as this depended on the sectors and the region of activity at the moment of hiring. However, because institutional changes occurred through combined legal provisions from multiple sources (regional laws and collective agreements), firms' eligibility did not necessarily translate into actual treatment at the level of the individual worker. There was a degree of uncertainty for employers as to which of the two apprenticeship contracts should have been applied, resulting in an incomplete overlap between firm eligibility and workers' assignment to treatment.
Transformations of old contracts into new ones were not allowed and limitations were explicitly set to avoid firms dismissing an old-regime apprentice and re-hiring her with the new one.
Data
To estimate the effect of the reform on the apprenticeship transitions to other contracts, we use administrative data derived from social security registers made available by the Italian Social Security We select an inflow sample of individuals starting a spell of apprenticeship in 2007 and follow them at a monthly frequency for the following seven years until the end of 2014 (the last data-point available to us). We retain individuals aged 19-24 at the beginning of the apprenticeship spell, because younger individuals were not eligible for the new apprenticeship and older ones were eligible for the old regime only in special cases. This selection rule generates a sample of 17,958 individuals. Since apprenticeships have a maximum duration of five years we can observe individual trajectories at least two years after the end of the apprenticeship. Of course not all apprentices complete the maximum duration and many terminate the contract earlier to move to other forms of employment (or non employment). In Figure 2 we plot the rate of survival in the apprenticeship contract for our inflow sample of 2007. We observe that 19% of apprentices exit the contract within the two initial months of the probationary period; 51% terminate the contract after the third month and before the second year of contract while 30% have a longer duration.
The administrative data record the reason for the contract's termination: 60% of terminations occurring in the first year of the apprenticeship are due to quits, while 13% are lay-offs; other causes of termination are transformation into an employment contract (8%) and contract expiration (6%), while in 13% of cases the reason for termination is unknown. The high incidence of workers' resignations should be carefully interpreted. Empirical studies in other countries suggest that firms may hire "cheap" apprentices to adjust their workforce to the business cycle (e.g. Merrilees, 1983; Askilden and Nilsen, 2005) . Besides, employers might encourage workers' resignation to get around high firing costs induced by EPL. If we look at the exit destination of the early leaver in the first year, we see that 72% of them exit our database the month after the end of the contract. These youths are not employees in the salaried private sector, collaborators, or unemployed (receiving benefits).
In Table 2 we describe the employment patterns differentiated by type of contracts for the apprentices hired in 2007. All apprenticeship contracts are terminated at the end of our observation period and, as shown in Figure 2 , the hazard rate shows two spikes at the end of the third and the fourth year. This implies a drop of the survival rate in the initial apprenticeship contract of 6 percentage points (p.p.) and of 4 p.p. respectively. The proportion of youths remaining employed in the salaried private sector decreases over time and at the end of the seventh year 56% are still employed (the sum of columns 1-6). At the end of the seventh year about 39% of apprentices have an open-ended contract (14% within the same firm, 25% in another firm), 5% have a different apprenticeship contract in another firm, 11% have a temporary contract, 1% are external collaborators. Finally, 4% of the individuals are in unemployment benefits and almost 40% are not in our database anymore. As the apprenticeship regime grants unemployment benefits only in special cases, most of the latter are likely uninsured unemployed (we refer to this category as "out-ofdatabase").
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Firm size is an important variable for apprentices. Early dropout is much more pronounced in small firms with less than ten employees: within the first year 54% of the apprentices hired in these firms exit compared to 45% of the apprentices hired in large firms. One of the possible explanations could be the looser dismissal rules for firms below fifteen employees in Italy and the larger incentive to churn due to higher tax rebates. Furthermore, after seven years apprentices in large firms are much more likely to have a permanent job in the same firm (20% versus 11% in small firms) and just slightly more in other firms (27% versus 24%). Large firms seem to be able to offer better career opportunities to the apprentices although two-thirds of the apprentices are hired in firms with less than ten employees. An explanation for the high popularity among small firms is the larger tax rebate that these firms enjoy.
As explained in Section 2, two apprenticeship regimes coexisted in 2007 depending on the geographic region and the sector of activities of the firm at the moment of hiring. In our inflow sample 10,744 and 7,204 apprentices were hired with the new and the old regime respectively. If we split the sample by apprenticeship regime we observe noteworthy differences. As shown in Figure 1A in the Appendix, apprentices in the new regime tend to transit more to open-ended contracts from the fourth year onwards, especially within the same firm. Apprentices in the old regime move more to temporary contracts and other apprenticeships. Besides, an important share of apprentices in the old regime moves out of our database already in the first months. For these youths we observe a cyclical pattern for both the share of youth out-of-database and the share of temporary contracts, indicating some sort of seasonal work. This is likely caused by the implementation of the reform by CBAs, which saw some sectors such as tourism postponing the reform.
As shown in Table 2A in Appendix, the type of apprenticeship regime is indeed correlated with several characteristics. Because of the implementation via CBAs, the most noticeable difference is the concentration in sectors such as Wholesale, Retail Trade, Business services and Construction for the new regime and Food, Tourism and Personal Services for the old regime. New regime apprentices are characterised by a higher probability of being hired by larger firms and a better employment history such as higher past remuneration and higher chances of having already experienced an openended contract in the past.
It is clear that the apprentices in the two regimes are different. Furthermore, the regions which implemented the reform earlier than others might differ in labour market characteristics which affect the future employment rate of the apprentices. Both these reasons prevent us from interpreting the observed differences as the causal effect of the reform. In the next section, we explain how we control for selection on observable characteristics to estimate the causal effect of the reform on the apprenticeship transition.
Analytical framework
We are interested in the effects of the new apprenticeship contract on the outcomes of apprentices relative to the counterfactual case in which they would be hired under the old apprenticeship regime.
We estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT):
where is a binary treatment dummy indicating whether the apprentice is hired with the new apprenticeship contract rather than with the old one and (1) and (0) represent the counterfactual outcomes of the apprentice with and without treatment. The ATT is the parameter of interest because it answers the question of what has been the causal impact of the policy for those that have been "treated" relative to the hypothetical case in which they did not receive the treatment and were hired in the old scheme.
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While conceptually well defined, the ATT (as other causal parameters) involves counterfactual quantities and therefore cannot be directly estimated using equation (1) due to lack of information. In the absence of credible sources of exogenous variation in treatment assignment, we overcome the problem of selection into treatment by replacing counterfactuals with the outcomes of an appropriate control group, whose members are identical to treated units in all the relevant characteristics affecting the outcome. We use the apprentices hired with the old scheme to form the control group, and use balancing techniques to ensure that treated and controls are comparable in terms of the likelihood of receiving the treatment given their observable characteristics. More specifically, given our sample of N units indexed by i, we apply the inverse probability weighting estimator (IPW, see e.g. Hirano et al., 2003) that weights control units based on the odds of receiving treatment given their observable characteristics:
where sums run over the entire sample, N1 and N0 are the number of treated and control units, is the odd ratio of the treatment given the covariates , and ( ) is the propensity score. 6 The IPW uses the outcomes of controls in place of the unobservable outcomes of the treated in the counterfactual scenario of no treatment, and gives more weight to control units that on the basis of their characteristics have a higher predicted odd ratio of being treated. The validity of identification rests on the assumption of conditional independence,
i.e. after controlling for the propensity score the potential outcome in absence of treatment ( 0 ) should be orthogonal to the treatment assignment. of jobs, length of the non-employment spell before the apprenticeship and a dummy for ever being in unemployment subsidies).
We include firms' characteristics because firms are heterogeneous in their churning behaviour (particularly across industries) and omission of these variables might result in inflation of the estimated effects. Consequently, the estimated effect is better interpreted as the net effect of treatment holding constant firms characteristics. Note that even if our administrative data have no information on educational attainment, the set of individual characteristics used to estimate the propensity score provides a good approximation for the stock of human capital of the apprentices. More generally, since we control for detailed labour market histories, following Imbens and Wooldridge (2009) we argue that our conditioning variables control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity related to labour market outcomes.
Even controlling for the large set of covariates described above, conditional independence may still fail because of (time varying) unobservable factors that jointly determine treatment and outcomes. As discussed in the preceding sections, policy adoption occurred in a staggered fashion across regions, and we are worried about migrations of future apprentices to adopting regions on the basis of the expected returns in terms of employment or wage prospects. To dispel these doubts about potential threats to identification, we use data from the labour force survey between 2004 and 2008 and estimate difference-in-difference regressions in which individual indicators for either regional migration or daily commuting across regional borders are regressed on a set of individual controls, time dummies and regional dummies, plus a treatment indicator assuming value equal to one whenever a region has adopted the new apprenticeship in a certain year. We run these regressions using different age groups, and allowing for lags in the effects of the policy changes. None of these exercises produced statistically significant estimated effects of the policy change on migration or commuting flows (results are available on request) which rules out endogenous migration or commuting as sources of bias in our estimates.
Results
Estimates of the propensity score are available upon request and show that the likelihood of being hired on the new apprenticeship scheme varies with the characteristics of the firm (industry and size)
and not so much with the characteristics of the worker (e.g. type of last job and past employment history), suggesting that endogenous selection into treatment by personal characteristics may be less of an issue in our analysis. Diagnostic tests show that the estimator performs rather well in balancing covariates across treated and control units (Table 2A in the Appendix).
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Effects of the new apprenticeship on employment
We report results from estimating at a monthly frequency the effect of the policy on labour market trajectories in the seven years after the apprentice is hired. We consider nine non-mutually exclusive destinations for the apprentices hired in 2007: employee; apprentice with the initial firm; apprentice with another firm; permanent employee; permanent employee with the initial firm; permanent employee with another firm; temporary employee; unemployment benefits recipient; out of the database (which includes self-employment, public sector, education, uninsured unemployment and inactivity). We report estimated effects graphically in Figure 3 .
Overall, there is a positive effect of the new apprenticeship on employment of about 2 p.p.
throughout the seven-year time window considered. Results show that the policy has been extremely successful in curbing the early drop-out of apprentices; the share continuing the apprenticeship increases in the first year by 6.0 p.p. (or 13.8% of the stock of apprentices in that time window), reaching a maximum of 6.8 p.p. at the end of the third year (corresponding to 43.4% of those still in apprenticeship at that time). The effect becomes moderately negative in the fourth year because, while many apprenticeships of the new regime reach their natural termination date, some contracts in the old regime are still effective (for example the craft sector had a duration of 5 years in the old regime); the effect eventually converges to zero after 5 years. Since the reduction of dropout is already observed in the first months of the spell, the estimated effect may not come from the extension of maximum duration of the reformed apprenticeship and is likely the result of the combined effect of the minimum remuneration and the higher (expected) productivity of the apprentices due to the enhanced firm-specific human capital. These policy changes discourage firms from churning.
7 As for the covariate "apprentices hired in firms with more than 500 employees" we do not have a sufficient number of units in the old regime to balance the treated group (47 versus 891 units), we remove these individuals before estimating the propensity score (i.e. trimming on covariates). Since lack of overlap of the propensity score can also bias the estimates and increase the variance (Lechner and Strittmatter, 2017) , we trim the treated units with a propensity score above the 99.9 percentile of the control units which leaves us with about 98% of the treated units.
Another evident effect of the policy emerges when looking at the transition to permanent employment, which follows a time pattern that is somehow symmetric compared to the one of attachment to the initial apprenticeship. The policy reduces transitions to permanent employment in the first four years after hiring, consistent with the already observed positive effect on attachment to the apprenticeship. Afterwards, there is a positive effect of about 4 p.p. over the fifth year, which carries over also to the sixth and seventh year after the initial hiring, though at slightly lower level (+ 3 p.p.). Distinguishing job transitions within the same firm from those that occur between firms,
shows that the bulk of the effect on permanent employment occurs through promotions, particularly during the fifth year after initial hiring.
Remaining panels in Figure 3 show a slightly negative effect on both transitions into another apprenticeship and on exits from the sample, while there is no significant effect on transitions to temporary employment or to unemployment benefits. The negative effect on attrition from the administrative panel is approximately constant throughout the time window, which suggests that the time pattern of the effects on drop out from apprenticeship or transitions to permanent employment are not an artefact of selective attrition.
Heterogeneous effects on employment by gender and firm size
Results obtained by considering men and women separately are in Figure 4 . In general, the effects are similar in the two cases, but there are exceptions. Most notably, there is a differential effect on transitions to stable employment at the end of the apprenticeship. While the effect for women is long lasting and evident until the end of the window of observation, the effect for men is short-lived and fades out after one year. Distinguishing transitions by their destination reveals that for men the diminished effects is driven by transitions outside the firm that initially hired the apprentice, for which there is no effect whatsoever.
We now consider how the estimated impacts of the reform vary with firm size. Specifically, we split the sample of treated apprentices depending on whether they are initially hired by firms with more or less than ten employees, because this is the threshold for eligibility to the higher tax rebate.
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In Figure 5 we plot the two effects, using apprentices in the old regime as the control group for both.
The positive effects that we have estimated on the overall treated sample seem to come mostly from the apprentices hired in firms with more than 10 employees. The positive effect on attachment to the apprenticeship is much smaller in firms with less than ten employees. At the beginning of the sixth year, the different lock-in effect translates into very different transitions to permanent employment.
In particular, the effect on permanent employment in the same firm is zero in small firms, while in 8 Apprentices are concentrated in small firms and about 70% are hired in firms with less than 10 employees.
larger firms the impact is +6.3 p.p., corresponding to a 39.7 percent increase relative to those in openended contracts in the same firm at that time. In the following two years the effect remains relatively constant for the apprentices hired in larger firms, while for the smaller firms it decreases becoming slightly negative at the end of the seventh year (-1.4 p.p.). "New" apprentices hired by firms above the 10 employees threshold also have a higher chance of working in a permanent job in other firms at the end of the seventh year (+3.2 p.p.) compared to the control group, while there is no such effect of the policy in small firms. On the other hand, for small firms the policy seems to have a limited effect on increasing attrition from the sample.
The more likely explanation for the worse performance of the reform on small firms is the lack of firms' capabilities to perform on-the-job training, which might have eventually reduced the overall training opportunities of the apprentices. Furthermore, any potential positive effect might be minimized in smaller firms as they have a higher incentive to churn due to the higher tax rebate and an incentive not to increase the size of their permanent staff. Indeed, because apprentices do not contribute to determining firm size for legal purposes, for firms just below the 10 employees threshold transitions from apprentice to regular employee (either permanent or temporary) trigger the loss of eligibility requirements for higher tax rebates.
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Effects on wages
The INPS data contain information on gross pay and the total number of full-time equivalent working days, from which we obtain the full-time equivalent gross daily wage for each month in the seven years window starting on January 1 st 2007. To take into account earnings attrition over the period, we perform the analysis with and without including cases with missing wage information, and impute zero wage to missings in the former case; the resulting wage outcome can be seen as an omnibus measure of compensation that includes non-employment spells.
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Results are reported in Figure 6 . Including (left panel) or not (right panel) zero wages increases the month-to-month volatility of the estimated effects and reduces the precision of the estimates, but the overall pattern is not much affected. There is an initial sizeable effect of the new apprentice contract on wages, which are almost 20 percent higher for apprentices hired with the new regime compared to those in the old one. This wage increase is in line with the higher minimum wage introduced by the reform. Interestingly, the wage gap with apprentices in the old regime shrinks over 9 An identification strategy based on a regression discontinuity design (RDD) estimator exploiting the firm size discontinuity is not possible as in the data the firm size is regrouped by class. 10 The propensity score is estimated on the full sample and used throughout the observation window irrespective of the availability of wage information at any given point in time. As a robustness, we compared treatment effects on wages in the last month of observation re-estimating the propensity score only for cases observed with a valid wage in that month, finding no substantive change in results. Alternatively, we estimated treatment effects on wages limiting the sample to the balanced panel with valid wage information, finding again that results are robust.
time, especially during the first two years after hiring, which suggests higher wages to comply with the law may come at the cost of reduced wage growth. However, there is a significant long-run wage effect of the reform (about 3 p.p., and roughly stable after the 5 th year), which possibly reflects the increase of apprentices' human capital thanks to better opportunity for training in the new regime.
It is also interesting to consider heterogeneity of wage effects, and we do this in Figure 7 focussing our attention on the sample with valid wage information. There is a distinctive difference between men and women in terms of the effect on entry wages, which is about half in the case of women compared with men. For both men and women there is a decline of the effect during the first two years after hiring, and a long-term effect of about 4 p.p.. Looking at heterogeneity by firm size, the most remarkable result is that for firms above the 10 employees threshold there is no significant wage effect in the long run, though the point estimates for the last month are equivalent (Figure 8 ).
Finally, we have to note that estimates for any months after hiring are potentially affected by changes in the composition of the treated group. As the employment effect is heterogeneous by firm size, different compositional changes may partially explain the different ATT on the wages.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have found significant effects of the 2003 reform of the apprenticeship contract on wages and employment probabilities. The aim of the reform was to move the Italian system closer to the German dual system of a paid apprenticeship with on the job training: it increased minimum pay and allowed firms to provide training on the job rather than externally. We minimize the usual problems of selection and omitted variable bias exploiting the heterogeneity of the implementation of the reform between regions and sector which resulted in the co-existence of two apprenticeship regimes during the period 2005-2011. We find that five years after hiring, the new contract improves the chances of moving to a permanent job in the same firm, yet this happens mostly in large firms.
There are also sizeable long-run wage effects of the reform, well beyond the legal duration of apprenticeships, compatible with increased human capital accumulation thanks to the training provisions of the reform. These results are helpful for the many countries which implement reforms designed to bring the apprenticeship system closer to the German "dual system". 
